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Abstract
Most studies fail to ﬁnd an impact of school inputs on outcomes
such as test scores. We argue that this might be a consequence of
ignoring the possibility that households respond optimally to changes
in school inputs and thus obscure the real eect of such provision on
cognitive achievement. To incorporate the forward-looking behavior of
households, we present a household optimization model relating house-
hold resources and cognitive achievement to school inputs. In this
framework if household and school inputs are technical substitutes in
the production function for cognitive achievement, the impact of unan-
ticipated inputs is larger than that of anticipated inputs. We test the
predictions of the model for non-salary cash grants to schools using
a unique data set from Zambia. We ﬁnd that household educational
expenditures and school cash grants are substitutes with a coe!cient
of elasticity between -0.35 and -0.52. Consistent with the optimization
model, anticipated funds have no impact on cognitive achievement, but
unanticipated funds lead to signiﬁcant improvements in learning. We
a r et h u sa b l eb o t ht oo r d e rt h ee ects of dierent kinds of spending
and capture their impact on cognitive achievement.
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1. Introduction
In the last two decades the relationship between schooling inputs and educational outcomes has
received considerable attention. Although it is recognized that households play a critical role in the
determination of such outcomes, the literature has split in two strands.1 One strand, concerned
with the impact of school inputs on cognitive achievement, has focused on estimating educational
production functions where cognitive achievement is determined as a function of schooling inputs.
The second strand is concerned with the eect of household characteristics on cognitive achievement
independent of school inputs. However, the notion that household responses themselves aect the
relationship between cognitive achievement and school inputs has received little attention in the
literature.
In a recent paper Todd and Wolpin (2003) point out that in the presence of household responses,
estimates based on the production function approach will capture a “policy-eect” that incorporates
both the marginal impact of school inputs on outcomes as well as household responses to such
inputs. This is the question addressed here: How are we to isolate and understand the relationship
between school inputs and cognitive achievement in an environment where households respond to
t h ep r o v i s i o no fs u c hi n p u t s ?
To examine this question we ﬁrst derive a household optimization model of cognitive achieve-
ment. The model incorporates the basic assumption that households respond optimally to the
provision of inputs at the school level. However, we also incorporate the notion that households
are forward-looking so that responses occur not only in the period that school inputs are provided,
but the moment that new information becomes available. Our explicit consideration of the dynam-
ics has the strong implication that since household adjustments occur with any new information,
production function parameters can be identiﬁed only through the impact of unanticipated inputs
on cognitive achievement.
In this framework, the impact of school inputs depends on (a) whether they are anticipated or
not and (b) the extent of substitutability between household and school inputs in the production
function for cognitive achievement. If household and school inputs are technical substitutes, an
anticipated increase in inputs in the next period increases household contributions in the current
period and decreases them in the next, whereas if they are technical complements, the impact
of anticipated increases in school inputs on current contributions depends on the strength of the
households’ preferences for a smooth consumption path. Unanticipated increases in school inputs
1The path-breaking Coleman Report (1966) for instance stresses the importance of household characteristics for
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in the next period preclude household responses in either the current period or the next. These
dierences lead to a testable prediction: If household and school inputs are (technical) substitutes,
unanticipated inputs will have a larger impact on cognitive achievement than anticipated inputs; if
they are complements, the relative eects depend on household preferences.
We test this prediction using data for Zambia in 2002-2003. The educational environment in
the country is particularly well suited for our empirical exercise. The system is largely based on
public schools (less than 2 percent of all schools are privately run) and the country has a history of
high enrollment rates and school participation, suggesting that household involvement in children’s
education is high.2 In 2000 the government legislated a ﬁxed cash grant to every school. These
grants were large. Among rural schools, they represented 66 percent of household level educational
expenditures for the lowest wealth deciles and 19 percent for the top wealth decile. Moreover the
simplicity of the allocation rule ensured that the grants reached their intended recipients (see Das,
Dercon, Habyarimana, and Krishnan 2003), suggesting that in the year of the survey the ﬁxed cash
grants would be anticipated by households making their educational investment decisions for the
year.
In addition schools could also receive cash from other sources, but these alternative sources were
highly unreliable and unpredictable. In the year of the survey, less than 25 percent of all schools
received such grants and conditional on receipt, there was tremendous variation with some schools
receiving 30 times as much as others. Apart from cash, few resources were distributed to schools
during the year of the survey. Finally, following an agenda of “free” education, all institutionalized
parental contributions to schools were banned in April 2001 (typically these took the form of Parent
Teacher Association fees). Taken together this implied that educational expenditures for children
could be met either through cash grants to schools or through direct parental contribution at the
level of the household. These two factors present exactly the framework required to test our model
with high parental contributions towards educational inputs on the one hand and two dierent
streams of cash disbursements to schools, one steady and the other unpredictable, on the other.
To exploit the characteristics of the educational environment, we collected a unique data set
for a representative sample of schools in four provinces of the country (covering 58 percent of the
population). The survey includes data on school inputs as well as two test scores on the same
sample of students one year apart. To supplement this data, we also collected information for
households matched to a sub-sample of schools identiﬁed as “remote” using GIS mapping tools.
This allows us to directly relate household and school inputs in an environment where issues of
2Net enrollments are upwards of 80 percent for both boys and girls (Figures 2a and 2b).Wkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 3
school choice are eliminated. We are then interested in the eect of anticipated and unanticipated
cash grants to schools on household educational expenditures and cognitive achievement.
We ﬁnd strong support for the household approach to cognitive achievement. Using the matched
school-household data, our results suggest that household educational expenditures and cash grants
to schools are substitutes. The elasticity of substitution between the two is high and signiﬁcant,
with estimates ranging from —0.35 to -0.52 depending on the speciﬁcation used. In line with the pre-
dictions of our model, unanticipated grants have a signiﬁcant and substantial impact on the growth
of cognitive achievement while the eect of anticipated grants is small and insigniﬁcant. These re-
sults hold for the subjects of Mathematics and English (although the dierence is more pronounced
for the latter), and are robust to potential mis-speciﬁcation arising from omitted variables in the
regression.
The signiﬁcance of our results goes beyond the particular policy environment considered here.
A failure to reject the null hypothesis in studies that use the production function approach could
arise either because the eect of school inputs on cognitive achievement through the production
function is zero or because households substitute their own resources for such inputs. While in
our case the substitution may take the form of textbooks or writing materials, in a more general
setting it may include parental time, private tuition and other inputs. The results show that the
policy eect of school inputs is dierent from the production function parameters. This has vital
consequences both for estimation techniques and for educational policy; a detailed discussion comes
later.
This work is innovative for a number of reasons. First, the methodology adopted here extends
t h ew o r ko fB e c k e ra n dT o m e s( 1 9 8 6 )t ot h ed e t e r m i n a t i o no fc o g n i t i v ea c h i e v e m e n ta n dt h u s
allows household responses and school inputs to be incorporated in a single conceptual framework.
Second, the unique data collected on matched schools and households permits the direct estimation
of household responses to school inputs; while this is clearly an important issue for policy, there
are few direct estimates of this relationship. Third, the combination of funding patterns in the
country and panel data on cognitive achievement provides an excellent opportunity to separate
policy eects and production function parameters of schooling inputs; doing so yields new insights
on the process through which school inputs may aect educational outcomes. The methodology
and the unique data thus provide a ﬁrm microeconomic foundation for the relationship between
school inputs and cognitive achievement in the context of a household optimization model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3
presents the model and the empirical speciﬁcation is derived in Section 4. Section 5 describes theWkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 4
data and sampling technique and Section 6 presents the results from the matched school-household
data. Section 7 presents the results of anticipated and unanticipated cash grants on the growth of
cognitive achievement while Section 8 discusses the policy relevance of our work and possibilities
for future research.
2. Review of the Literature
This work relates to three strands of the literature. The ﬁrst examines the relationship between
schooling inputs and cognitive achievement in the context of production functions. The second
examines the impact of household characteristics on educational outcomes. Finally, a third strand
studies the impact of public subsidies on private outcomes, mostly in the context of labor supply
and private transfers. We describe each of these brieﬂy.
2.1. Production Function
The literature on educational production functions (for a review, see Hanushek 1997) attempts
to estimate the eect of school inputs on cognitive achievement. The estimation concern that
most studies have dealt with is the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, which could contaminate
estimates if correlated with the provision of inputs. In response to the omitted variable problem that
such heterogeneity creates, studies have tried to exploit “natural-experiments” (Angrist and Lavy
1999; Case and Deaton 1999; Urquiola 2003), “value-added” speciﬁcations (Hanushek 1971) or more
recently, randomized treatment-control designs (Banerjee, Cole, Duﬂo, and Linden 2003; Glewwe
2002 provides a review) to argue for causality. Below, we show that our approach allows for greater
ﬂexibility in the treatment of unobserved heterogeneity–heuristically, since such heterogeneity is
already known at time period t  1, it has no ee c to ng r o w t hr a t e sbetween t  1 and t.3
2.2. Household Characteristics
At the level of the household, studies have examined the relationship between educational out-
comes such as enrollment and drop-outs and household characteristics in the context of a household
optimization model (Glewwe 2002 and Jacoby and Skouﬁas 1997).4 Fewer studies have examined
the role of household characteristics on cognitive achievement; exceptions include Brown (2003),
Case and Deaton (1999) and Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) who look at the relationship between
parental education and child learning, and Alderman and others (1997) who examine the eect of
household income on test scores.
3This is not without restrictions; for a more detailed comment see Footnote 10.
4We also follow a close parallel literature on consumption and health. For instance, optimal growth paths derived
in our model are similar to those in Foster (1995) who considers the impact of rice prices on child weight in Bangladesh
and Dercon and Krishnan (2000) who relate adult sickness to weight in Ethiopia.Wkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 5
Closer to the question on how optimal responses may alter the relationship between inputs and
outcomes is Lazear’s (2001) study on class size and achievement. In a theoretical examination of
school responses, Lazear (2001) argues that learning in classrooms depends both on the size of the
class as well as the number of “disruptive” children allocated to every class. Optimizing behavior
on the part of the school then implies that less “disruptive” students are allocated to larger classes
and this creates a spurious positive relationship between class size and cognitive achievement. This
paper extends the notion of optimal responses to the household, arguing that similar processes will
attenuate the relationship between school inputs and achievement.
2.3. Eect of Government Subsidies
Our ﬁndings on household responses do however have an established precedent in the literature
on private responses to public transfer programs. The research on this front has typically examined
labor supply responses (Mo!tt 1992; Ravallion and Datt 1995) and private transfers (Cox and
Jimenez 1995 and Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1994) to ﬁnd that the eect of government subsidies is
generally attenuated through the presence of household responses. The Euler framework developed
here has also been used to assess the extent of household responses to school feeding programs.
Jacoby (2002) for instance, tests for a “ﬂy-paper” eect in the Philippines by examining the dier-
ence in household caloriﬁc intake for children on school and non-school days. There is, however, a
gap in the literature on household responses to school inputs, partly due to tricky sampling issues
(more on this below) and partly due to the predominance of the production function approach in
the literature relating schooling inputs to outcomes. By providing estimates on the size of these
responses, we thus suggest areas for future research.
3. Theoretical Framework
3.1. The Conceptual Experiment
Consider a household that receives a single school input, that can either be anticipated or
unanticipated. The anticipated input is fully incorporated into the utility maximization problem.
For the unanticipated input, households expectations at time t  1 (when household decisions are
made) are zero, so that they are unable to respond by adjusting their own expenditures. How do
































Figure 1. Household Substitution
Figure 1 depicts this conceptual exercise in the case where household preferences are deﬁned
over cognitive achievement and other goods. For simplicity, we assume that cognitive achievement is
related to schooling inputs through a single-input linear production function. In this framework, any
additional unanticipated input will sustain expenditure on all other goods at X0.C o n s e q u e n t l yt h e
change in cognitive achievement will reﬂect entirely the characteristics of the production function
mapping inputs to attainment, moving the household (for instance) from E0 to Esurprise.C o n s i d e r
now the impact of inputs of the same magnitude that are fully anticipated by the household at
time t  1. To the extent that this change is viewed as permanent by the household, the budget
constraint will shift out to the outer (non-dashed) linear at time t1 itself reﬂecting the fact that
households will optimally incorporate all future information into their decisions at t  1.M o r e
generally, it could be that the change is (rationally) expected to last a ﬁxed number of years, in
which case the budget constraint would shift to an intermediate level (shown by the dashed line)
representing the change in permanent income secondary to the anticipated inputs. In either case,
t h e r ew i l lb en od i erence in educational inputs provided by the household between t  1 and t.
This dierence forms the basis of our statistical test: Cognitive achievement should respond to
unanticipated rather than anticipated inputs.
This special case implicitly assumes that household and school inputs are fully substitutable in
the production function for cognitive achievement and therefore anticipated changes have no impact
between two subsequent time periods. In the formalization of the model below we introduce two new
components. First, we view cognitive achievement as a durable good with household preferences
deﬁned over it’s stock. Second, we incorporate the production function for cognitive achievementWkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 7
as a constraint in our optimization. Below we see that this aects the program directly through the
user-cost of the durable good. In general, anticipated and unanticipated inputs will have dierential
ee c t s ,b u tt h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h e s ee ects will depend on the extent of substitutability between
household and school provision of the input.
We start with two general assumptions on preferences and the production function for cognitive
achievement. The Euler equation derived deﬁnes conditions governing the growth of test scores5.
B a s e do nt h i ss o l u t i o nw ed i s c u s st h ed i erential impact of anticipated and unanticipated school
inputs on test-score growth. Finally, we consider how credit constraints can aect our results.
3.2. Model
A household (with a single child attending school) derives (instantaneous) utility from the
cognitive achievement of the child TS and the consumption of other goods X. The household
maximizes an inter-temporal utility function U(.), additive over time and states of the world with
discount rate (< 1) subject to an inter-temporal budget constraint (IBC) relating assets in the
current period to assets in the previous period, current expenditure and current income. Finally,
cognitive achievement is determined by a production function relating current achievement (TSt)t o
past achievement (TSt31), household educational inputs (zt), school inputs (wt), non time-varying
child characteristics (µ) and non time-varying school characteristics (). We impose the following
structure on preferences and the production function for cognitive achievement:
[A1] Household utility is additively separable, increasing and concave in cognitive achievement
and other goods.
[A2] The production function for cognitive achievement is given by TSt = F(TS t31,w t,z t,µ,)
where F(.) is concave in its arguments.
Under [A1] and [A2] the household problem is




At+1 =( 1 + r).(At + yt  PtXt  zt) (2)
TSt = F(TSt31,w t,z t,µ,) (3)
AT+1 =0 (4)
5This relates closely to the discussion on durable goods and inter-temporal household optimization discussed, for
instance, in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Jacoby and Skouﬁas (1997), Foster (1995) and Dercon and Krishnan
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Here u and v are concave in each of its arguments. The inter-temporal budget constraint, Equation
(2) links asset levels At+1 at t +1with initial assets At, private spending on educational inputs
zt, income yt a n dt h ec o n s u m p t i o no fo t h e rg o o d s ,Xt. The price of educational inputs is the
numeraire, the price of other consumption goods is Pt and r is the interest rate. The production
function constraint, Equation (3) dictates how inputs are converted to educational outcomes and
the boundary condition, Equation (4) requires that at t = T, the household must have zero assets
so that all loans are paid back and there is no bequest motive.6
In this formulation credit markets are perfect so that there are no bounds on At+1 apart from
Equation (4); the perfect credit market assumption is relaxed in our discussion on the impact of
liquidity constraints below. Moreover, households choose only the levels of Xt and zt so that school
inputs (wt) are beyond its control. At the time the household has to make its decision, it knows
the underlying stochastic process governing wt but not the actual level. In other words, we assume
that school inputs are a source of uncertainty in the model–for simplicity the only source. This
assumption is retained throughout the theoretical discussion, but is later relaxed in the empirical
test, where we allow for unobserved time-varying characteristics of the household that may inﬂuence
school inputs.
Maximization of Equation (1) subject to Equation (2) and Equation (3) provides a decision
rule related to TSt, characterizing the demand for cognitive achievement. To arrive at this decision
rule, we deﬁne a price for cognitive achievement as the “user-cost” of increasing the stock in one
period by one unit, i.e., the relevant (shadow) price in each period for the household. Once such a
price is deﬁned, the program is transformed into a standard consumer optimization problem (see
for instance, Deaton and Muelbauer 1980).
To deﬁne this price, note that if cognitive achievement could be bought and sold at the price,
v, households would pay v in the ﬁrst period to buy one unit. In the next period, they could then
sell (1) units (if depreciation is at the rate 1) and receive the current value
(13 )v
1+r .T h u s ,t h e
6There are two observations regarding the form of the utility function. First, an alternative assumption, that the
beneﬁts from the child’s cognitive achievement are only felt in the future, would not change the model fundamentally.
If these beneﬁts are only related to the ﬂow of earnings in the future from the child’s cognitive achievement, then
the education decision becomes similar to a pure investment decision. As long as the beneﬁts from education are
concave in its arguments, the results would be similar. Note that this of course, does not imply that the steady state
value of human capital will be the same in either case, but only that along the growth path ﬁrst-order conditions
remain unchanged (see Banerjee 2003 for a detailed discussion of steady states under dierent assumptions regarding
the form of the utility function). Second, the utility function uses a stock as one of its arguments: We assume that
households care about the level of educational achievement. The results below are unaected if one assumes that
households care about the (instantaneous) ﬂow from educational outcomes, provided that this ﬂow is linear in the
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cost of holding one unit of test scores for one period is v 
(13 )v
1+r and this deﬁnes the user cost. In
the context of a production function, households “buy” test scores in period t is by increasing zt.
S i n c ew ea r ei n t e r e s t e di nt h ec o s to fb o o s t i n ga c h i e v e m e n ti no n ep e r i o do n l yw ea s s u m et h a ti n
the next period they can reduce zt+1 to ensure that the overall stock of test scores at t+1remains








Similar to the expression (v 
(13 )v
1+r ) derived above, the ﬁrst term measures the cost of taking
resources at t and transforming it into one extra unit of cognitive achievement. When implemented
through a production function, the price is no longer constant–if the production function is concave,
the higher the initial levels of cognitive achievement, the greater the cost of buying an extra unit as
reﬂected in the marginal value, Fzt(.). Of the additional unit bought in period t,t h ea m o u n tl e f tt o
sell in period t +1is FTSt(.) and the second term thus measures the present value of how much of
this one unit will be left in the next period expressed in monetary terms. Once this is deﬁned, the
standard ﬁrst-order Euler condition related to the optimal path education of educational outcomes












Intuitively this expression (ignoring uncertainty for the moment) suggests that if the user-cost of
test scores increases in one period t relative to t1, along the optimal path this would increase the
marginal utility at t,s ot h a tTSt will be lower. This is a standard Euler equation stating that along
the optimal path, cognitive achievement will be smooth, so that the marginal utilities of educational
outcomes will be equal in expectations, appropriately discounted and priced. Finally, the concavity
of the production function will limit the willingness of households to boost education fast since the
cost is increasing in household inputs. Thus, under reasonable restrictions, the optimal path will
be characterized by a gradual increase in educational achievement over time.
To proceed with the empirical speciﬁcation we impose the following conditions on preferences
and the production function:
[f A1] Household utility is additively separable and of the CRRA form.
[f A2] TSt =( 1 )TSt31 + F(wt,z t,µ,) where the Hessian of F(.) is negative semi-deﬁnite.
Under [f A1] marginal utility is deﬁned as TS
3
t ,w i t h the coe!cient of relative risk aversion.
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where et is an expectation error, uncorrelated with information at t1. Taking logs and expressed


















ln(1 + eit) (8)
or, the growth path is determined by the path of user-costs, and a term capturing expectational
surprises.
3.3. Anticipated and Unanticipated Inputs
A key issue is how increases in school level inputs wt aect the optimal path of cognitive
achievement. Since school resources are not known with certainty until after households make
decisions regarding their own inputs, this will depend on whether such increases are anticipated.
Thus, let wa
t(wu
t ) be inputs at time t that were anticipated (unanticipated) at t  1.I n t h e c a s e
of anticipated increases, the eect on the path of outcomes will depend on its impact on the user-
cost of educational achievement at t, since there is no direct impact on the budget constraint (all
information included anticipated inputs will have been incorporated into the budget constraint at
time t  1). In particular, using the implicit function theorem with Equation (5) and assuming








T 0 if Fztwt U 0 (9)
This implies that if household and school inputs are technical substitutes (Fztwt < 0), anticipated
increases in school inputs at t will increase the relative user-cost of boosting at t, resulting in lower
growth of cognitive achievement, ceteris paribus, between t and t  1, consistent with the optimal
path Equation (6). Alternatively, if school and households inputs are technical complements, in-
creases in school inputs at t will increase the marginal productivity of household inputs at t,a n d
through the decline in user-costs lead to higher growth in cognitive achievement along the optimal
path between t and t  1.
To clarify the dynamics between t  1 and t further, note that there are two eects we need
to distinguish. The ﬁrst is due to the change in relative user-costs while the second is governed
by the households desire to smooth consumption, given by Equation (6). The second eect will
always provide incentives to spend more at t  1 to take advantage of the additional government
spending at t. If household and school inputs are substitutes, households will optimally recognize
that relative user-costs at t will be higher than at t1–the implicit price of buying test scores will
increase in the future. Consequently, to retain the optimal growth path of Equation (6) households
will choose to increase their own spending at t1. Thus, the growth in cognitive achievement will
be lower relative to the case where no household responses are possible.Wkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 11
In the case of technical complements, the behavioral response is exactly the opposite, since
relative user-costs will be lower at t, households will optimally delay spending. However, in this
case the user-cost and the smoothing eects move in opposite directions so that the overall growth
could still be higher relative to the case where wt =0 . Comparing the two cases of complements
and substitutes, household spending is thus counter-cyclical relative to government spending when
household and school inputs are substitutes. When they are complements, the smoothing and the
user-cost eects move in opposite directions, although in the special CRRA case that we consider
here ( f A1) the user-cost ee c ti sh i g h e rt h a nt h es m o o t h i n ge ect so that the pro-cyclicality of
household inputs is maintained.
For unanticipated increases in school inputs, since households are unable to respond, they are
pushed o their optimal path and the increase in educational achievement in period t is given by
Fwtdwt. What is the size of this eect compared to a similar increase in anticipated inputs? When





















T 0 if Fzw T 0 (10)
For unanticipated increases the change in the growth path is give by ln(TSt + wunant
t Fw) which is
strictly positive. Thus, the eect of an unanticipated change is higher than that of an anticipated
change in the case of substitutes, and relative sizes cannot be ranked when they are complements
without further restrictions on the form of the utility function. These results are summarized in
Table A for the case of the CRRA.
Table A










A Anticipated   Substitutes Increases Decreases  Lower  A<{B,C,D} 
B Anticipated   Complements  Decreases  Increases Higher  B>A 
C  Unanticipated   Substitutes  Unchanged  Unchanged  Higher  C>A ;C=D  
D  Unanticipated Complements Unchanged  Unchanged  Higher D>A;  C=D 
We stress that increases in outcomes due to unanticipated inputs (in the case of substitutes)
are sub-optimal; household education spending will be higher than that justiﬁed by the decline in
the user-cost of boosting educational achievement. Consequently, in the next period, the household
will restore itself to the optimal path using the “correct” user-cost. However, since cognitive
achievement is a durable the increase in outcomes will not be entirely undone, since incentivesWkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 12
exist to maintain the stock at a higher level. It is important to realize therefore that the distinction
between anticipated and unanticipated inputs has greater relevance for identiﬁcation purposes than
it has for policy–although unanticipated inputs lead to larger increases in cognitive achievement
in the current period, this will be smoothed out subsequently.
3.4. Credit Constraints
A straightforward way to incorporate credit constraints is to assume that any point in time
assets have to be nonnegative, i.e., credit is impossible unless fully collateralized (At  0). The
deﬁnition of the user-cost remains unaected so that the main impact is that credit constraints may
limit the ability to equate appropriately discounted and priced marginal utilities. More speciﬁcally,
let t be the multiplier linked to the non-negativity constraint of carrying over assets between t1












in which a binding credit constraint (t > 0) would result in higher marginal utility at t  1
(lower educational achievement), than what would have been implied without credit constraints
(t =0 )–see also Equation (6). What is the impact of unanticipated and anticipated changes
in wt in this case? First, the impact of unanticipated changes in unaected: since no behavioral
response is possible, the eect still works through the production function of cognitive achievement.
Ad i erence here is that with binding credit constraints the eect might bring the household closer
to its unconstrained optimal path by alleviating the credit constraint. The impact of anticipated
changes now works via two eects. First the eect through the change in user-costs has exactly the
same impact as before. Second, there is a further eect through the budget constraint: since fewer
household resources are required than before to achieve the same level of educational achievement,
this would alleviate the budget constraint (i.e., reduce the shadow cost of the constraint, t).
The size of the overall eect on cognitive achievement would depend on the income eects
related to the alleviation of the budget constraint. If the reduction in credit constraints leaves
spending on private inputs unaected (so that no more other goods are consumed despite the
relaxation of the budget constraint), then the impact would be indistinguishable from unanticipated
changes. However, in the more plausible case that other goods are normal, in general, the eect
of the anticipated relative to unanticipated changes will retain the same ordering (i.e., anticipated
changes have a lower (higher) eect if school and household inputs are substitutes (complements)
with the usual caveat: see our discussion on the relative ranking of growth eects in the case of
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3.4.1. Summary
T h ek e yr e s u l t so ft h i ss e c t i o nc a nt h u sb es u m m a r i z e da sf o l l o w s :
1. When household and school inputs are substitutes, an increase in anticipated inputs at t will
lead to an increase in household inputs at t1, a decrease at t a n ds u b s e q u e n t l yal o w e rr a t e
of growth of cognitive achievement.
2. When they are complements, the opposing directions of the user-cost eect and the house-
hold’s desire to smooth implies that the overall eect depends on household preferences.
3. Unanticipated inputs, on the other hand, have no impact on household inputs at t and t  1
and thus always lead to a higher growth in cognitive achievement between t and t  1.
4. Finally, these results remain unchanged (though attenuated) by the imposition of credit con-
straints under the mild assumption that other goods consumed by the household are normal.
In testing the predictions from this model using cash grants as the relevant input, we recognize
that schools should optimally allocate these grants across dierent inputs. One way to interpret
these results is that schools are constrained in what they can do and are hence unable to spend cash
grants optimally. These constraints could arise either due to thin markets (for instance, in the case
of teachers) or lack of scale economies (for instance, to improve infrastructure).7 The estimated
equations are thus a “reduced-form” in the sense that they represent the eect of grants taking into
account constrained maximization at the school level.
4. Empirical Speciﬁcation
Our empirical strategy is based on two related tests. We ﬁrst test whether household educational
expenditures and school cash grants are substitutes. The theory implies that if this is the case,
contemporary household funding zt should decline with an increase in wt. This is a cross-sectional
test–as long as the assumptions of the regression framework are maintained we should ﬁnd that
households matched to schools with higher cash grants spend less on their children’s education. We
establish that household and school inputs are technical substitutes, and so proceed to examine the
hypothesis that (under the assumption of technical substitution) the impact of anticipated grants
is smaller than that of an equivalent unanticipated amount. We detail each of these in turn.
7As an example, in the case of teachers, while most head-teachers complained of shortages, only in two cases were
teachers hired by the school. Both turned out to be signiﬁcantly worse (in terms of education and training) than
government teachers, leading to considerable dissatisfaction among the community.Wkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 14
4.1. Testing Substitutability between Household and Cash Grants to Schools
We estimate a generic demand model in which household spending on school-related inputs is
regressed on wealth (proxying permanent income), school attributes and school grants according
to the following system of equations.
lnzij =  + 1Ai + 2 lnwa
j(match i) + 3 lnwu















j(match i) = * + 1j + j (14)
In Equation (12) zij is the spending by the household on child i enrolled in school j, Ai are assets
owned by household of which i is a member (as a proxy variable for the permanent income of the
household), wa
j is anticipated grants in school j that matches to child i, wu
j is unanticipated grants
received by school j, Xi are other characteristics of child i and Pi are province level dummies.
The error term is decomposed into two components where %i and %j are child and school speciﬁc
error terms respectively. Further, zij itself is a censored variable; we observe zW
ij only for strictly
positive values (corresponding to an enrolled child) and for cases where the optimal zW
ij is negative,
we observe censoring at zero. We test 2 < 3 =0 , i.e., households respond negatively to expected
grants at the school level by cutting back their own funding, but are unable to respond to cash
grants that are unanticipated.
A potential estimation problem is that our estimate of 2 is inconsistent if the error in the
selection equation (14) is correlated to that in the demand equation, so that cov(j,%j) 9=0 .I n
particular, we will see that in the Zambian case, wa
it = Constant
enrollment, so that omitted variables that
increase the probability of sending a child to a speciﬁc school as well as the unconditional (on
school choice) spending on educational materials at the household level will lead to the inconsistent
estimation of 2. Such a problem may arise, for instance, if there are rich villages where households
send their children to school but also spend more on education. The coe!cient f 1 would then
capture the dierences in underlying wealth rather than a causal response to rule-based grants. To
some extent, we control for such wealth dierences by including three dierent wealth indicators in
the regression; the household wealth index, the average wealth index for the village and the average
wealth index of students attending the school. Nevertheless,we are concerned that there are other
omitted variables that lead to the inconsistent estimation of response elasticities.
To address this issue, note ﬁrst that if we can restrict the sample of villages to only those where
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the parental choice of sending children to school in the ﬁrst place still remains a problem.8 To
address this issue, we base our identiﬁcation on careful sampling taking advantage of the very high
historical enrolment rates in Zambia, even in remote rural areas. Thus, we restrict attention only
to those villages where the distance costs of travelling to a school other than the one surveyed are
very high (more on this below) so that any potential beneﬁts of choosing an alternative school are
unlikely to outweigh the cost of transportation. Under this assumption the problem is simpliﬁed
to a two-dimensional choice between schooling and no-schooling.
We then test for the weak exogeneity of lnws using the methodology proposed by Blundell and
Smith (1986). The exclusion restriction for this test is satisﬁed if there is a variable, j,w h i c hi s
correlated with lnws,b u tn o tzij.We use the size of the eligible cohort in the catchment area and
t h ed i s t a n c et os c h o o lo nt h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a tt h e s ev a r i a b l e sa r ec o r r e l a t e dt oe n r o l l m e n t ,b u tn o t
expenditure on the child conditional on enrollment. The Blundell and Smith (1986) test rejects
exogeneity if the coe!cient on the residual obtained from Equation (14) is signiﬁcant in Equation
(12) above. The inability to reject the null hypothesis thus establishes the exogeneity of lnws under
the assumption that the size of the eligible cohort and the distance from the school are exogenous
to household spending on children’s schooling.
From the basic hypothesis, 2 < 3 =0 , we can further exploit the data to test whether
the grants are “truly” anticipated in the sense that households make their own decisions taking
anticipated cash grants into account even before such grants are actually received. If there are
schools where, at the time of the survey, wa 9=0but wa
received =0 , a test can be based on the
dierence in the estimate of f 2 depending on whether we use wa or wa
received as the explanatory
variable.9 Speciﬁcally if household decisions are based on anticipated rather than received grants,
f 2(wa) < f 2(wa
received) since if wa > 0 household spending will be less than what would be predicted
by using wa
received(= 0) as the explanatory variable. Thus, we can estimate a second equation
ln(zi)= + 1Ai + i 2 lnwa
j(received) + 3 lnwu
j + DiPi + %i + %j (15)
and test i 2 < 2. A rejection of the null would lead to greater conﬁdence in the technical-
substitution results since it would not only imply that cash grants to schools crowd-out household
funding (2 < 0), but further that households anticipate such grants and make their expenditure
decisions before the grants are actually disbursed.
8This strategy has been used previously by Case and Deaton (1999) and Urquiola (2003) in their studies of
schooling inputs and cognitive achievement.
9Satisfying the requirement that w
a =0at the time of the survey is uncorrelated to the error term of the regression.
Our identiﬁcation is based on the fact that these were schools that were surveyed earlier in the month combined with
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4.2. Test-Score Hypothesis
Once we have established that household and school grants are technical substitutes, we can re-
strict ourselves to testing whether the impact of unanticipated grants on gains in cognitive achieve-
ment is higher than that of anticipated grants. A major concern in the parallel literature on
production functions when testing for the relationship between school inputs and cognitive achieve-
ment has been the presence of unobserved child and school level heterogeneity. In the context of
the Euler framework, consistent estimates may be obtained with a fairly ﬂexible form of hetero-
geneity in the production function. To see this return to Equation (8) and the production function
given by [f A2]. We showed previously that t = 1
Fzt(.) 
(13 )
(1+r)Fzt+1(.).N o w ,a sl o n ga sFzµi =0or
Fzt = µi(g(wt,z t)),s ot h a tlnit =l nti, the unobserved heterogeneity embodied in µi is elim-
inated from the estimating equation. This formulation is then su!cient to ensure that the path
of user-costs is deﬁned only in contemporaneous variables and is unaected by ﬁxed heterogene-
ity and past school achievement.10 Assuming identical risk preferences, an empirical speciﬁcation






= o + 1 lnwa
it + 2 lnwu
it + 3Xt + it (16)
in which wa
it and wu
it are anticipated and unanticipated input changes, in this paper proxied by ﬂows
of funds, while Xt reﬂects all other sources of changes in the user cost between t and t  1.T h e
core prediction is that the marginal eect of anticipated is lower than unanticipated funds when
household and school inputs are substitutes. This prediction is unaected by the presence of credit
10How restrictive is this particular formulation of the production function? Note ﬁrst that we can either write the
production function as
TS it =( 13  )TS it31 + 1wt + 2zt + 3µi +  4j
or as
TS it =( 1 3 )TS it31+f(wt,z t,µ ij) if we make sure that Fzt = µi(g(wt,z t). We can compare this to three popular
speciﬁcations used in the literature on the estimation of production functions for cognitive achievement, discussed in
Todd and Wolpin (2003). The ﬁrst, the contemporaneous speciﬁcation has no role for either past levels of cognitive
achievement or for the possibility that household inputs zt will be correlated to unobserved school and child level
variables. The production function that we use here allows for both of these possibilities. The second speciﬁcation,
which has been widely used in the recent past is the value-added speciﬁcation
Tit = 1Tit31 + 2wt + 3zt
Note that in this case, the unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to enter only at time 0 so that Ti0 = µi–the child’s
mental "endowment" leads to a ﬁxed increase in test scores, instead of an incremental increase in every period. A
more general form is given by the cumulative speciﬁcation where
Tit = 1Tit31 + 2wt + 3zt + 4µi
so that child endowment can aect cognitive achievement in every period. These three widely used speciﬁcations
have increasing data requirements. In particular, the cumulative speciﬁcation would require at least three periods of
data to arrive at consistent estimates. Our speciﬁcation of the production function not only allows for the cumulative
speciﬁcaiton, but also allows unobserved heterogeneity to enter in a multiplicative form so that the marginal value
of household inputs can depend on unobserved child and school endowments. Further, the production function also
allows for the possibility that past inputs may aect current cognitive achievement through ways other than lagged
achievement–speciﬁcally, as long as we maintain the additive separability of Fzt and past inputs, our user-costs will
remain unaected. The immense ﬂexibility in the form of the production function for cognitive achievement that the
Euler framework allows for is then a major advantage over attempts to directly estimate such relationships.Wkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 17
constraints, even though 1 is likely to be larger in that case.
The ﬁrst econometric concern relates to the identiﬁcation of anticipated and unanticipated cash
grants. In the data anticipated grants are well identiﬁed–such grants are based on a legislated
rule and a detailed tracking (implemented in the survey itself) conﬁrms that schools receive exactly
the amount stipulated. Our interpretation of unanticipated grants may be more problematic since
time-series data on cash grants, which could be used to calculate deviations from the mean, are not
available. We assume that grants other than the anticipated amount, which are determined at the
discretion of the District Education O!ce, are unanticipated. This would probably overstate the
unanticipated component–schools could have been informed previously of such grants, or there
could be dierential expectations for dierent schools. To see how this aects our estimates, ideally






= o + 1 lnwa
it + 2 lnwu
it + %it (17)






= !o + !1 ln(wa
it + wu
it)+%it (18)
Under the assumption that 2 > 1, 1 <
ˆ
!1 < 2 if our construction of unanticipated grants
contains little in the way of unmeasured anticipated grants or if 1 is small compared to 2. If in
the extreme, all of this were (unmeasured) anticipated, 1 =
ˆ
!1 = 2. Thus, it is likely that the
estimates on unanticipated grants represents a lower-bound of the true eect.11
The second concern is potential inconsistency in our estimate of 2 if cov(lnwu
it,%it) 9=0 , possibly
arising from dynamic heterogeneity (time varying school or district-speciﬁc eects).12 This may
be the case for instance if there is a change in a school-level variable that leads, on one hand, to
greater unanticipated grants and, on the other hand, to higher learning gains (the introduction of
11Ignoring terms involving %it (which vanish in the expectation) and assuming deviations from means of each term:
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Using the assumption 2 > 1 and the fact that ln is concave in its arguments, it follows that:
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Also,
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Thus the relationship between
ˆ
!1 and 2 depends both on the extent of mis-measurement as well as the ratio of 2
to 1. In the case where mis-measurement is high and  1 is high,
ˆ
!1 can overshoot the true impact of unanticipated
grants. The independent results on household substitution and the discussion of Section 5.3 below suggest both that
1 is small and that any unmeasured anticipated component is small or non-existent.
12Note though that omitted variable bias due to heterogeneity of ﬁxed characteristics, which normally plague
cross-sectional estimates, are accounted for through the Euler framework.Wkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 18
a highly motivated teacher who both searches for such funds and teaches exceptionally well is an
example). With such omitted variables, our estimate of the impact of unanticipated grants would
be inconsistent.
We correct for this problem through an instrumental variables strategy. From the Euler frame-
work, any variables at t  1 are available for use as instruments since such information will have
been incorporated into the decision process. In addition we also use variables that were unknown at
t1 but had an impact on unanticipated grants at t.I np a r t i c u l a r ,b a s e do nt h ed e t a i l e dt r a c k i n g
of funds, we use per-pupil grants that the district o!ce received from external (non-governmental)
sources, allocated without any consultation with the o!ces.
For our instrumentation strategy to be valid, we require that the instrumental variables are
positively correlated with the amount of unanticipated funds received, but are not correlated with
the gain in cognitive achievement over the year. These requirements are likely to be satisﬁed with
our choice of instruments. First, the amount of such grants boosts the overall funds available at
the district level and hence the unanticipated funds passed on to schools. Simultaneously, since
such funds arrive from external sources, it is unlikely that districts were able to actively inﬂuence
the amount of cash grants that they would receive. This addresses our main concern that there
might have been changes at the district level such that districts that received more grants were also
more likely to “place” this in a targeted manner. Consequently, our strategy of using district-level
aggregates combined with interactions of lagged stock variables at the school-level isolates that
p o r t i o no fu n a n t i c i p a t e dg r a n t st h a ta r eu n c o r r e l a t e dt ot h ee r r o rt e r mi nE q u a t i o n( 1 6 )a b o v e .
Finally, our results are reported at the school level. Since this is a straightforward linear
aggregation, there is no reason to expect results to change; simultaneously, we are better able to
handle the clustering of errors at the level of the district. To ensure that the sample remains the
same, we compute school level scores only for those students who were present in both years for
the test.
4.3. Other Econometric Concerns
There are two other speciﬁc concerns that arise due to the speciﬁc nature of our data. We
brieﬂy detail our strategy in dealing with each of these below.
4.3.1. Treatment of Zero Cash Grants
A large number of schools receive zero unanticipated grants in the sample. Since the estimation
is based on the log transformation, we need to modify this variable in order for the log to be deﬁned.Wkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 19
Moreover the problem arises both when cash grants are explanatory (in estimations of the impact
on cognitive achievement) as well as dependant variables (in the ﬁrst stage of our instrumentation
strategy). We address each case in turn.
When cash grants are used as explanatory variables, we use a modiﬁcation of the method
developed by Johnson and Rausser (1971) to derive the optimal constant to be added on to zero
values. The basic intuition behind this approach is that the constant should be chosen so that
the estimated relationship between cash grants and cognitive achievement is identical for both
schools with zero and non-zero cash grant values (dealing with potential selection issues through
the IV strategy above). In particular, we can treat the sample of schools as two separate samples
consisting of m observations of zero grant values and n  m observations of positive grant values.
The regressions can then be represented as
ln(TSi)=1 ln(Xi + k)+%i
i =1 ,2,....,m
ln(TSi)=2 ln(Xi)+%i
i = m +1 ,...,n
and k is estimated under the restriction that 1 = 2. In addition to presenting estimated coe!cients
b a s e do nt h ee s t i m a t e de k, we also present robustness tests based on estimated coe!cients when the
unanticipated grants are treated as dummy variables (i.e., making a distinction only between those
who received and those who did not). The results are robust to these alternative speciﬁcations.
For the case where cash grants are the dependant variable, we estimate a hurdle model (Wooldridge
2001) where the probability of receiving such grants is estimated separately from the amount re-
ceived conditional on receipt. Under the assumption that the dependant variable, y, is distributed
log-normally conditional on y>0, the maximum likelihood estimate of the unconditional E(y) is




where x is the predicted value from the OLS regression of lny = x + % (restricted to y>0)
and (x) is the predicted probabilities estimated from a probit. In this instance, a hurdle model
is preferable to the Tobit since the latter requires the probability of receipt as well as the amount
received (conditional on receipt) to be governed by the same process. Contrary to this, the hurdle
allows for these processes to dier, so that in the predicting equations the process of determining
which schools receive positive grants is separate from the determination of how much the schools
receive. Note that since we are interested in the E(lny|x) and not ln(E(y|x)) the above simpliﬁesWkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 20
to
E(lny|x)=( x)(x)
Finally, the prediction for this hurdle model is then used in the second stage of our instrumen-
tation strategy, with an appropriate standard error correction for the use of generated regressors
(Murphy and Topel 1985).
4.3.2. Measurement Error: Test Scores
Our second concern relates to the treatment of test scores. Our measurement of the child’s
human capital, TSt, is based on tests administered in English and Mathematics. We model scores
in the test as arising from the distribution of the underlying latent variable (TS t) following the
literature on Item Response Theory (Birnbaum 1967). This method has several advantages in that
the properties of the estimated latent variables are easy to interpret and the importance of the
characteristics of the test are made explicit in the estimation. Further, the maximum likelihood
procedure used to estimate the latent variable generates weights that are locally-optimal in the
sense that they minimize the error of classiﬁcation. The latent variable, TSt, is estimated through
a maximum likelihood procedure using a structural assumption regarding the mapping between
TS t and the probability of a correct response. The standard error of this estimate can then be
computed as 1 sS
j Ij(TSt) where Ij(TSt) is Fisher’s information for a particular question, j,a n dt h e
sum is over all questions in the test (see Appendix 1).
How does this error of measurement eect our estimates? To the extent that the change in TS t
is the dependant variable in our regressions, this increases the standard error of the regression, but
our estimates remain consistent and unbiased. A correction is required, however, since the error
structure is now characterized by a variance-covariance matrix that violates homoskedasticity of
the disturbance terms. Since the standard error of our estimate is itself a function of TSt,t h e
variance-covariance matrix consists of terms like 2
%+2
ui, where % is the regression error, and ui
the measurement error for individual i. We account for this by adjusting standard errors for an
arbitrary error-structure due to clustering.13
13Greater e!ciency can be obtained by using the standard error of the estimates to implement a (modiﬁed) variance
weighted least squares estimation. However, simulations in Das and DeLaat (2003) show that the e!ciency gains
from doing so (compared to the robust sandwich estimator) are small–the major e!ciency gains arise from the use
of estimated latent variable rather than the test score itself.
A more serious problem arises if cash grants are targeted toward poorly performing schools in the base year.
Measurement error in test scores implies that gain-scores are higher for schools that performed poorly in the base
year (Kane and Staiger 2001, 2002). Thus improvements in cognitive achievement could arise due to mean reversion
rather than a causal relationship with such grants. Although measurement error due to dierences in cohorts (a
major source of variation in Kane and Staiger 2002) are eliminated by retesting the same children, in the case of
Mathematics the gradient between gains and initial scores is signiﬁcantly negative. We ﬁnd no evidence of targetingWkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 21
5. Data
5.1. The Country Context: Education in Zambia
Our data are from Zambia, a landlocked country with a population of 10 million, almost en-
tirely dependant on copper for export revenues. With a decline in copper prices, there has been a
commensurate decrease in income and government resources. As a result, average real per capita
government education expenditure in 1996-98 was only about 73 percent of its 1990-92 level, declin-
ing further to an average of about 60 percent of this level by 1999-2000 (World Bank data based
on Government of Zambia Financial Statements).
This economy-wide decline has also had an impact on educational attainment. Although Zambia
outperforms other African countries with similar per capita income levels, net primary school
enrolment at about 72 percent is at a historically low level, having seen some decline during the
previous decade (Figures 2a and 2b).14 Both the government and households have responded to
this worsening of the education proﬁle. The government for instance initiated a Basic Education
Sub-Sector Investment Program in 2000, which along with administrative changes in the delivery of
educational services and restructuring of the payroll for teachers also led to some direct ﬁnancing of
schools through cash disbursements. While household responses are clearly harder to interpret, we
will see below that parents tend to be active in their children’s education with high contributions,
both in terms of expenditures as well as time. It is precisely this involvement that will be exploited
in our tests below.
5.2. Sampling
T h es t u d yi sb a s e do nas u r v e yo f1 8 2s c h o o l si nf o u rp r o v i n c e so ft h ec o u n t r ya n dw a sc o l l e c t e d
by the authors in 2002.15 The choice of schools was based on a probability-proportional-to-size
sampling scheme, where each of 35 districts in the four provinces was surveyed and schools were
randomly chosen within districts with probability weights determined by enrollment in the school.
Thus, every enrolled child in the district had an equal probability of being in a school that partic-
ipated in the survey.
In every school, 20 students were randomly chosen in Grade V in 2001 and an achievement
test was administered in Mathematics, English and the vernacular.16 T h es a m et e s tw a sa d m i n -
toward poorly performing schools based on observable characteristics. Targeting based on observables is addressed
through the instrumentation strategy.
14These levels are similar to Kenya, higher than Congo or Mozambique, but below those typically attained in other
Southern African countries (see for example, World Bank and UNESCO).
15Lusaka, Northern, Copperbelt, and Eastern provinces were surveyed. These four provinces account for 58 percent
of the total population in Zambia.
16In cases with less than 20 students, all children were tested.Wkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 22
istered again in 2002 to the same students leading to the construction of a two-year panel of test
scores. In addition to the tests and a school questionnaire, questionnaires were administered to the
head-teacher and all teachers who were teaching or had taught the tested children. These children
were also asked to complete a pupil questionnaire in every year with information on basic assets,
demographic information, and educational ﬂows within the household. Further, as part of the ex-
penditure tracking exercise, district and provincial educational o!ces associated with the surveyed
schools were administered questionnaires detailing ﬁnancial activity over the year (receipts and
disbursements of cash and materials).
In addition to the school survey, household surveys were administered to 540 households in
35 villages. The choice of villages was designed to eliminate complications arising from school
choice (see Section 4.1): Based on a geographical mapping of all schools, those that satisﬁed a
“remoteness” criteria (deﬁned as the closest neighboring school being at least 5 kms away) were
chosen as starting points for villages in the household survey. From these schools, the closest (or
second closest depending on a random number) village was chosen and 15 households were randomly
chosen from households with at least one child of school-going age.
Two dierent samples are thus used for the empirical section of this paper. The ﬁrst sample
(the Household Sample) is based on a subset of 35 remote schools, with data on matched school
and household inputs for 540 households. Since 15 households were selected from every village, we
have data on cognitive achievement for only 200 students in this sample and hence can use this data
only to test the resource-substitution hypothesis. The larger sample of 182 schools provides data
on changes in cognitive achievement for 2,600 students with matched data on school, teacher and
head-teacher attributes but not on household expenditures. This sample is used to test the Test-
Score hypothesis. Finally, data from provincial and district levels are used to provide instrumental
variables for the Test-Score Hypothesis. Table B clariﬁes the use of our data.
Table B
Sample   Questionnaires  Learning Achievement  Used For 
Household  Household Questionnaire  X  Substitution Hypothesis 
School Funding, School 
Attributes 
3,600 students in 2001    School 
Head Teacher and Teacher 
Attributes 
2,700 re-tested in 2002  Test Score Hypothesis 
Tracking District/Province  Level 
Funding 
X Instrumental  Variables Wkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 23
5.3. Description: Schools
Reﬂecting the overall decline in the education sector, schools in our sample are under some
stress (Table 1a). There are over 100 children for every functional classroom, student-teacher ratios
are above the Zambian guideline of 40 and there are a large number of repeaters. Moreover, for
almost every variable rural areas tend to do worse than their urban counterparts and this dierence
is further magniﬁed in the case of the schools chosen for the household sample. The dierence is
particularly marked for asset holdings where the mean value of the asset index is one standard
deviation lower in rural and 1.2 standard deviations lower in remote villages compared to urban
areas.
Turning to educational inputs, there are three distinct types of inputs that schools may receive–
teaching inputs through new teachers or increases in sta remuneration, in-kind receipts in the form
of textbooks or chalk, and cash receipts. The ee c to ft e a c h e ri n p u t si ss t u d i e di ns o m ed e t a i li n
Das, Dercon, Habyarimana, and Krishnan (2003). Further, during the year of the survey, schools
received very little inputs in-kind–on average less than 0.05 textbooks, 0.012 desks, 0.001 chairs
and 0.01 boxes of chalk were received per student.17 Consequently, the impact of the third type of
inputs (cash receipts excluding teacher’s salaries) on cognitive achievement forms the basis for this
study.
C o n t r a r yt ot h ep o o rr e c o r do fi n - k i n dr e c e i p t s ,m o s ts c h o o l sh a dr e c e i v e ds o m ec a s ha n dt h i si s
explored further in the “cash grants” rows of Table 1a. There were two kinds of cash receipts that
schools could receive. Rule-based grants were received under legislation that grants $600 ($650
in the case of schools with Grades 8 and 9) to every school irrespective of enrollment.W e t r e a t
this as “anticipated” in our analysis. The second kind, discretionary grants were disbursed to
schools at the discretion of the District Education O!ce as well as external donors. We treat this
as “unanticipated” recognizing that this may overestimate the “true” unanticipated component of
cash grants .
One concern is that legislated allocations may have little to do with received grants and our
treatment of such grants as “anticipated” is thus incorrect.18 A tracking exercise presents some
encouraging results on this front (Table 1a, Cash-Grant Characteristics). In three out of the four
provinces, over 93 percent of the schools surveyed received exactly the amount allocated. In the
17This was largely due to problems in the planning department of the Ministry of Education coupled with problems
in procurement, rather than due to the lack of funds (less than 60 percent of the allotted budget was actually used
during the ﬁscal year).
18In the case of Uganda for instance, Ablo and Reinikka (2000) showed that less than 30 percent of the allocated
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fourth province, Lusaka, this percentage dropped to 71 percent and this was attributed to delays in
disbursement. Based on receipts in the previous year as well as interviews with head-teachers and
district o!cials, it appeared that the remaining schools would receive the allocated disbursement
shortly after the survey.19 It is precisely this delay that is exploited in drawing the distinction
between wa and wa
received in Equation (15) above (details of the tracking exercise are in Das and
others 2003). Note also that the per-pupil rule-based grants are fairly high in absolute amounts
ranging from 60 percent of household educational expenditures for the poor to 45 percent for the
rich.
In contrast to the regularity of rule-based allocations, the probability of receiving discretionary
grants was much lower (24 percent). Conditional on receipts such funds tend to be either very
small or extremely large–the inter-quartile range for log discretionary grants ranges between 6
and 10 log kwacha per pupil with a coe!cient of variation greater than 6. Finally, variables such
as school or pupil characteristics have almost no predictive power in explaining the distribution of
discretionary funds–less than .05 percent of the variation in such funds can be explained through
dierences in student composition, characteristics of teachers (head-teachers) or the availability of
educational resources in the school.
The last point also addresses the potential targeting of discretionary funds (Table 1b). At
least on the basis of observable outcomes, there is little dierence between schools that received
discretionary funds vis-à-vis those that did not. Although schools that received such funds tend
to have students who are marginally wealthier and are located closer to the district o!ce, these
dierences are not signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. Moreover, there is no dierence in baseline
scores between schools that received discretionary funds and those that did not.20
Thus, on the one hand rule-based allocations are clearly demarcated and deﬁned, and schools
receive the amount stipulated. On the other hand, discretionary funds are more volatile–less than
one quarter of all schools receive such funds, and even conditional on receipts, the amount received
varies dramatically. Further, such funds do not seem to have been allocated in a targeted fashion,
at least on the basis of observable school and student characteristics. It is precisely this dierence
that forms the basis for our division of cash grants into anticipated and unanticipated components.
5.4. Description: Households
To complete our description, it is also instructive to examine household funding of school inputs
in comparison to the funding received from the government. In particular, if household educa-
19This was checked and conﬁrmed in the case of some schools in Lusaka province, two months after the survey.
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tional expenditures are small compared to school grants, anticipated grants may play a role in the
alleviation of credit constraints at the household level (although our empirical test would remain
valid). Figure 3 explores the importance of dierent funding sources for educational expenditure,
disaggregated by schools that received high/low anticipated cash grants (with the cuto at the
median).
In both types of schools, household expenditure accounts for a large share of total (public and
private) spending on education, ranging from 25 percent to 33 percent across schools that received
high/low cash grants. The other signiﬁcant expenditure share is accounted for by teachers salaries
(roughly 50 percent in both cases); ignoring this component implies that household expenditure
accounts for between 50 percent and 60 percent of total available expenditures. Since the household
data is based on a sample of remote schools that tend to be poorer, this percentage represents a
lower bound on the actual share of household expenditure in total funding. Clearly then, even in
remote and poor areas, households represent an extremely important component of educational
funding and it is likely that they have su!cient leeway to adjust for changes in expected grants at
the school level.
In anticipation of our results, Table 2 then looks at key household and school variables for
schools with high/low enrollments (and hence low/high anticipated grants). The ﬁrst row (matching
success) shows the percentage of children in the primary age group who were successfully matched
to the surveyed school, verifying our assumption of no school choice through the choice of the
sample. For both high/low grant schools, matches are above 95 percent, but there is a (signiﬁcant)
3 percent dierence suggesting that endogenous enrollment may still be an issue.
The next two rows describe school cash grants and household expenditures. There are large
dierences in the means of two groups, although interestingly total funding is roughly equivalent,
at K24,000 in low and K22,000 in high grant schools. The other rows in the table correspond to
observable components of schools and households. For a number of important variables (household’s
asset indices, mother’s/father’s education and village enrollment) there is no signiﬁcant dierence
between the two categories of cash grants. Moreover, in cases where dierences are signiﬁcant
(percentage with mother/father at home) the direction is the opposite of what we would expect
if enrollment was endogenous to villages and schools–high enrollment (low grant) schools tend to
have fewer children with parents at home and report fewer visits from teachers to the household.
These statistics thus suggest that (a) there are signiﬁcant dierences in household contributions
across low/high cash grant schools, and the null hypothesis that total funding is the same cannot
be rejected (b) while there are some di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categories, these dierences tend to be small or of the wrong sign. Our results on the substitutability
of household and school cash grants veriﬁes these broad results in a structured manner.
5.5. Description: Cognitive Achievement
Finally, our data on cognitive achievement are based on tests administered by The Examination
Council of Zambia in Mathematics and English for the same sample of children in 2001 and 2002,
following the sampling scheme described above. These children were initially tested in Grade V and
in 2002 they were tested in the grade that they were currently enrolled in. Although we should hence
have a two-year panel of test scores for 3,500 children (since there were less than 20 children in Grade
V in some schools), attrition in the data set leads to a smaller sample of 2,587 children. This drop
is attributable to a number of factors including school-transfers/drop-outs (30 percent), absence on
the day of the test (50 percent) and data issues arising from the inability to survey some schools
or adequately complete pupil rosters (20 percent). We ﬁnd some dierences in original scores, with
those who were unable to take the second test reporting signiﬁcantly lower English and Math scores
in the ﬁrst year (0.11 and 0.19 standard deviations. respectively), but do not ﬁnd any systematic
pattern in attrition across schools receiving dierent amounts of anticipated/unanticipated cash
grants.
Turning to learning gains over the year, students on average were able to answer 3.2 questions
more in Mathematics from a starting point of 17.2 correct answers (from 45 questions) and 2.4
more in English starting from 11.1 correct answers (from 33 questions). In terms of our latent
d i s t r i b u t i o n ,c h i l d r e ng a i n e do n0 . 4 2s t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o n si nM a t h e m a t i c sa n d0 . 4 0i nE n g l i s h .
Thus, after one year of teaching students were able to increase their scores by 6 percent and 7.5
percent in Mathematics and English, respectively.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the characteristics of the Mathematics and the English test with respect
to the standard error of our latent score distribution. For both Mathematics and English, the test
was “too-hard” in the sense that children at the lower end of the distribution have (much) higher
standard errors than those above the mean. Further, the English test was better designed than the
Mathematics with lower estimated standard errors at all points of the distribution. Following from
our previous discussion we thus expect considerable noise in our estimates, but also lower standard
errors for our cognitive achievement results based on the English compared to the Mathematics
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6. Results: Does Household Spending Substitute for School Cash Grants?
Our main interest is the estimation of Equations (12) and (15). To recapitulate, Equation (12)
estimates the relationship between household and school grants using anticipated grants that had
already been received at the time of the survey (wa
recieved). Equation (15) then uses the anticipated
grants (wa) instead (whether received or not at the time of the survey); if households truly anticipate
such grants, the elasticity of substitution based on the second equation should be greater than the
ﬁrst.
The estimation results are presented in Table 3. For every estimated equation there are two
speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst is the Tobit speciﬁcation where the sample includes all school going age
children and educational expenditures on children who are not enrolled is deﬁned to be zero. We
may be concerned that the Tobit speciﬁcation does not entirely capture the error structure of (12),
with clustering at the village level. To account for this clustering, we also present estimates from
ar a n d o me ect Tobit speciﬁcation that accounts for such clustering. Columns (1) and (2) thus
report results from Equation (12), and (3) and (4) from Equation (15). Table 4 then interprets these
coe!cients as the marginal impact (computed at the mean of the regressors) and the probability
that the dependant variable is uncensored.
The results are as predicted and robust to the sample and speciﬁcation used. Using wa
received
as the regressor, the estimated elasticity of substitution for anticipated grants is always negative
and signiﬁcant (f 2(wa
recieved) < 0) and ranges from -0.34 (Tobit) to -0.37 (Random Eects Tobit).
Further, f 2(wa) < f 2(wa
recieved) with the elasticity of substitution increasing to -0.46 (Tobit) to
-0.52 (Random Eects Tobit) suggesting that households truly anticipate these cash grants and
make their expenditure decisions prior to their actual receipt. Moreover, using wa as a regressor,
the coe!cient of unanticipated grants is small and insigniﬁcant (f 3 =0 ). For the speciﬁcation
where f 3 < 0,t h es i z eo ft h ec o e !cient is less than half that of f 2(wa
recieved) suggesting that there
may have been some household responses to unanticipated funding, but this was relatively small
compared to funding that was anticipated.21
These results present strong evidence for a high elasticity of substitution between anticipated
grants and household funding, and support the hypothesis that households make their educational
funding decisions prior to the actual receipt of such grants. Further, households do not respond
to unanticipated grants–despite the comparability of such grants (in amounts) to the anticipated
equivalent, there is little evidence that households alter their own behavior as a response.
21Note that to the extent that households did respond to unanticipated funding as well, this would imply that our
coe!cient on such funding in the test-score regression is an underestimate of the true production function parameter.Wkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 28
Our main worry with these results is the possibility of omitted variable bias that arises due to
the close link between anticipated grants and enrollment and this is addressed in Columns (5) and
(6). Following the strategy outlined in Section 4.2 we estimate the determinants of log anticipated
funding in the ﬁrst stage and use the residuals as an additional regressor in the speciﬁcations
estimated under Equation (15). Using anticipated funding in the ﬁrst stage with Equation (15) as
the second stage, the coe!cient on the residual is insigniﬁcant at the 15 percent level conﬁrming that
the log of anticipated funding is exogenous to child level educational expenditures and estimated
coe!cients thus represent a causal relationship (Columns 5 and 6, Table 3).22
7. Results: Test Score Hypothesis
7.1. Graphical Evidence
The results in the previous section provide strong evidence that school grants and household
funding are indeed substitutes–greater cash grants given to the school reduces the amount spent
by the household. As discussed in Section 3.3, when school and household inputs are technical
substitutes, the impact on learning gains of unanticipated is larger than that of anticipated inputs.
Figure 5 explores this relationship through non-parametric plots of the relationship between
cash grants and gain in cognitive achievement. The ﬁgure on the left shows the (annual) change
in cognitive achievement in the subjects of Mathematics and English plotted against (log) unantic-
ipated grants while the relationship between gains in cognitive achievement and (log) anticipated
grants. In both ﬁgures, the left axis shows the density of cash grants plotted on a histogram while
the right axis depicts learning gains in Mathematics and English, plotted against the log grants.
The ﬁgure veriﬁes our basic hypothesis: learning gains are higher for unanticipated compared to
anticipated grants. In the case of Mathematics there is a gain of almost 0.2 standard deviations
and for English 0.15 standard deviations moving from the minimum to maximum unanticipated
grants. Moreover, there is no discernible pattern in the case of Mathematics and a decline in the
case of English for anticipated grants.
Figure 5 also suggests reasons for high standard errors in our estimation procedure. From the
histogram for unanticipated grants it is clear that the distribution is marked by a large percentage of
schools that receive zero combined with substantial variation among those that do receive positive
amounts. Consequently, large variation in learning gains among the non-receivers might decrease
the precision of the estimated relationship between cash grants and learning gains. Further, there
22Note that this test is valid only if anticipated rather than received funding is used in the ﬁrst stage. If received
funding is used as the dependant variable we have imposed high enrollment for schools that received zero funding at
the time of the survey in combination with a lower than expected expenditure and this would lead to a rejection of
t h ew e a ke x o g e n e i t yo flnw
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appear to be dierences in the precise functional form between Mathematics and English. For
Mathematics small amounts of unanticipated grants have a low impact on learning achievement
while for English such investments have an impact but decreasing returns set in quickly at higher
levels. Although ideally we would like to estimate these non-linearities, our sample of 42 schools
that receive positive amounts precludes further sub-division. Thus, we account for non-linearities
through the inclusion of a quadratic term for unanticipated grants in Equation(16) and check for
robustness using a dummy variable for schools that received non-zero unanticipated grants.
7.2. OLS Results
Table 5 shows the results for English and Mathematics for four dierent speciﬁcations where
all estimations are at the school level.23 The ﬁrst speciﬁcation (column 1 for English and column 2
for Mathematics) is the most parsimonious and includes only anticipated and unanticipated grants
in the estimation. The next two columns then include four additional explanatory variables–-
a dummy for rural is included to proxy for “shifters” and three variables that capture potential
changes in user—costs–whether the head-teacher has changed, whether the head of the parent-
teacher association changed and the dierence in PTA fees. The third speciﬁcation (columns 7 and
8) include as variables the portion of anticipated funds that had actually been received by the time
of the survey, as in Section 6 above.
For all speciﬁcations we ﬁnd that the coe!cient on anticipated grants is small and insigniﬁcant
(except for the negative and signiﬁcant value in column 7 for English), marginally more so in
the case of English compared to Mathematics. For English the coe!cient on the linear term of
unanticipated grants is always positive and signiﬁcant, and for the quadratic term negative and
signiﬁcant. For Mathematics the results are not as sharp; the coe!cient on unanticipated grants
is smaller and insigniﬁcant in three speciﬁcations, but is signiﬁcant when unanticipated grants are
treated as a dummy variable. Treating cash grants as a continuous variable, these results imply
that the marginal impact of (log) grants on cognitive achievement at the mean is .048 standard
deviations for English and .029 for Mathematics, representing 12.5 percent and 7 percent of the
annual gain in learning. The results from the dummy speciﬁcation imply that schools receiving
non-zero unanticipated grants improve their learning by 0.12 (English) and 0.09 (Mathematics)
standard deviations, which corresponds to approximately one-third of the average gain through the
year.
23Since the estimated equation is linear, averaging over children should have no impact on the estimated coe!cients.
In fact, child-level regressions show similar coe!cients but the signiﬁcance is reduced when the regression is clustered
at the school rather than the district level. All coe!cients retain their signiﬁcance at least at the 10 percent level
of conﬁdence. Further, the results from the IV estimation are identical both in the size and the signiﬁcance of the
coe!cients. These dierences may arise due to the clustering of errors at both the school and the district level.Wkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 30
We make two observations on the set of estimated coe!cients. First, returning to the stan-
dard error of our latent score distribution, it is clear that the measurement error in the case of
Mathematics is much larger than that for English. This would suggest that our estimates our more
precise for the latter and could explain the signiﬁcant ﬁndings for English but not for Mathematics.
Second, in Figure 5 the dierences in English are driven primarily by schools receiving zero and pos-
itive grants while those in Mathematics are driven by the dierence between those receiving small
and large amounts. In using the log speciﬁcation, the optimal constant added to those with zero
unanticipated grants is only K3.73. Given the steep gradient of the logarithm function near zero,
the addition of a small constant implies that the estimated relationship is driven almost entirely by
the dierence between the “zero” and the “non-zero” group rather than by the “low positive” and
the “high positive” receivers. Consequently, in the case of Mathematics, the positive relationship
between the low and the high group is overwhelmed by the ﬂat portion before with the reverse
for English. However, when we use a dummy variable for whether or not the school received any
unanticipated funds as a regressor, both coe!cients are signiﬁcant and positive (and fairly close to
each other) since we “average” out these functional dierences.
7.3. IV Results and Comparison
The ﬁnal set of results we present corrects for the potential placement problem through the
instrumentation strategy detailed above. The ﬁrst stage from these results are presented in Table
6, and the results on learning changes using the instrumented unanticipated funds in Table 7. In
the ﬁrst stage, we ﬁnd that the grants that the district received from external sources signiﬁcantly
impacts on the amount of unanticipated funds that a school will receive; the only other signiﬁcant
variable is whether the district was one that was heavily contested in the run-up to the election the
same year as the survey. Together, the lagged variables and the funds received through external
sources account for 50 percent of the variation in unanticipated funds at the level of the school,
conditional on receipt. For the second part of the hurdle model, the probability that a school
receives any cash grants is determined largely by the status of the school as one that was eligible
to receive funds from an external donor program administered by the United Nations since 2000.
Turning to the instrumented estimation results, we ﬁnd that in all cases, there is an increase
in the linear and a decrease in the quadratic term of the estimated equation. Moreover, for both
English and Mathematics, the coe!cients on unanticipated funds and unanticipated funds squared
are always signiﬁcant, while on anticipated funds the coe!cients continue to remain small and
insigniﬁcant. However, due to the quadratic formulation, it is not immediately apparent that these
ﬁndings can be interpreted as evidence of positive-placement whereby schools that were likely to
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unanticipated is greater than that of anticipated grants, Table C presents results of Wald tests at
various points of the sample range.
Table C
Subject and Estimation Strategy Test Rejects Equality of Coe!cients Evaluated at (p values)
Sample mean 25th %tile Median 75th %tile 90th %tile
English (OLS) 5% 5% 5% 5% >10%
English (IV) 1% 1% 1% 5% 5%
Math (OLS) >10% >10% >10% >10% >10%
Math (IV) 10% 5% 10% >10% >10%
Since the marginal impact of unanticipated grants is given by b1+2b2X where b1 is the coe!cient
on unanticipated, b2 on unanticipated grants squared and X the point at which the marginal value is
evaluated, the Wald test takes into account the var(b1+2b2X) given by the usual expansion. Each
cell in the table shows the conﬁdence level at which the null hypothesis that the marginal impact
of unanticipated equals that of anticipated grants can be rejected. For English we ﬁnd that the
OLS results allow us to reject the null hypothesis at all points of the sample range at the 5 percent
level, and we are unable to reject the null at the 90th percentile. The IV results are stronger; the
null hypothesis can now be rejected at the 1 percent level for the mean, the 25th percentile and the
median, and the 5 percent level for the 75th and 90th percentile. For Mathematics, overall results
are weaker. We cannot reject the null hypothesis at any point of the sample range for the OLS
results. With instrumental variables, results are marginally better with rejections at the 10 percent
level for the sample mean and median, and at the 5 percent level for the 25th percentile.
8. Discussion and Policy Implications
Using data on learning achievement and non-salary cash grants to schools in Zambia we have
tested a model of dynamic household optimization with the key prediction that anticipated com-
pared to unanticipated grants will have a smaller eect on cognitive achievement if household and
school cash grants are substitutes. In the case of Zambia, we ﬁnd that the elasticity of substitution
between household and school grants ranges from -0.35 to -0.52. Consistent with our predictions,
we then ﬁnd that anticipated grants have zero impact on learning gains while unanticipated funds
increase learning by 0.05 (English) and 0.025 (Mathematics) standard deviations at the mean. The
estimated coe!cients are likely under estimates of the true production function coe!cient due to
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omitted variable bias arising either from school-choice or time-varying school eects. These results
have implications both for estimation and policy and we discuss each of these in turn.
8.1. Implications for Estimation
The dominant estimation technique for estimating the eect of school inputs on cognitive
achievement is based on the production function approach, where achievement (or changes in
achievement) is regressed on school inputs. Following Todd and Wolpin (2003), these estimates
represent the policy eect of school inputs that combines both the eect of inputs on cognitive
achievement through the production function, as well as household responses to such inputs. Our
use of unanticipated inputs allows the estimation of both eects separately, thus shedding more
light on the process through which school inputs may or may not aect educational attainments.
For estimation purposes, it may appear that the problem in the production function approach
arises due to omitted variables–if the researcher had access to both household and school expen-
ditures in the current period, it would be possible to accurately estimate the eect of the input
through the production function. While true in a static setting, this does not take into account
the possibility of inter-temporal substitution in a dynamic problem. Speciﬁcally, households start
responding to school inputs at the time that information regarding such inputs is revealed so that
the entire history of household inputs will be required from that point onward to estimate unbiased
production function parameters. The alternative approach followed in this paper is to examine the
portion of inputs that arrive as exogenous shocks so that households are unable to respond in the
current (or preceding) periods. In the absence of data on historical household inputs (as well as
details on the revelation of information) the use of unanticipated inputs allows identiﬁcation of the
production function parameter with greater accuracy.
The distinction we draw between anticipated and unanticipated inputs could also account for
t h ew i d ev a r i a t i o ni ne s t i m a t e dc o e !cients of school inputs on cognitive achievement (Glewwe 2002;
Hanushek 2003; or Kreuger 2003) The production function framework does not separate anticipated
from unanticipated inputs so that the regressor is a combination of these two dierent variables. The
estimated coe!cient is bounded below by the policy eect and above by the production function
parameter; the distance from either bound depends on the extent to which the schooling inputs
were anticipated or not.
There are a number of extensions that can be pursued in future research. While the use of the
Euler equation framework allows us to control for heterogeneity arising from a number of sources
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unable to control for heterogeneity due to the underlying production function or the household
discount rate. Second, we are unable to allow for non-linear eects of the lagged test score and
third, our speciﬁcation requires the use of an additive lagged test score in the production function.
The last two problems could potentially be addressed by panels that span a larger time period.
8.2. Implications for Policy
The argument developed here also has repercussions for educational policy. Our results do not
suggest an educational policy where inputs are provided unexpectedly. Although cognitive achieve-
ment in the current period does increase with unanticipated inputs, the additional consumption
now will push households o the optimal path. In subsequent periods, therefore, they will readjust
expenditures until the ﬁrst-order conditions are valid again–unanticipated inputs in the current
period will not have persistent eects in the future (except due to the durable nature of the good).
The policy framework that is suggested under this approach involves constructing appropriate
“spheres of inﬂuence”. Under such a framework schooling inputs are characterized by the level of
market imperfections that characterize their provision, as well as the degree of substitutability with
household contributions. Inputs are then divided into two categories–those within the sphere of
inﬂuence of either the government or the household.
The former would include inputs that are characterized by incomplete markets or other market
failures (see Miguel and Kremer 2003 for an example of market failures due to externalities) while
the latter would consist of inputs provided under competitive market conditions. Further, to the
extent that the government may be worried about the inability of households to smooth human
capital accumulation (for instance due to credit constraints), direct subsidies to households rather
than inputs at the school level characterize the optimal policy.
What inputs may lie in the governments “sphere of inﬂuence”? An important example may
be teaching inputs, whereby problems in the design of contracts (see for instance Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1991, for problems arising due to multi-tasking or Holmstrom, 1982, for problems arising
due to moral hazard in teams) or the generic non-availability of trained personnel in every village
c o u l dm a k ep u b l i cm o r ee !cient than private provision. Similarly, inputs that retain some aspects
of public-goods and would thus be under-provided in the private market are a good candidate for
government provision. Interestingly, both of these have been shown to have signiﬁcant impacts on
cognitive achievement (see for example, Hanushek 2001 and Banerjee, Cole, Duﬂo, and Linden 2003
on the importance of teachers and Glewwe and Jacoby 1994 on infrastructure).
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problem with the production function acting as a constraint opens up a new avenue for research,
one that explicitly recognizes the centrality of households and classiﬁes schooling inputs into the
categories discussed above. To construct the appropriate “spheres-of-inﬂuence” it would be impor-
tant to characterize inputs by their degree of substitutability vis-a-vis household provision. To do so
requires both the use of matched household and school surveys as well as the careful identiﬁcation
of surprises in the provision of inputs; in particular, long-term data on schooling inputs would allow
for cleaner identiﬁcation based on deviations from means, much as in the consumption literature.Wkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 35
9. Appendix 1
Proof of 5. To deﬁne the user cost, we consider a change in zt and zt+1 that increases cognitive
achievement by one unit in period t only. Formally,
dTSt = Fzt(wt,z t,µ,)dzt (19)
dTSt+1 = FTSt(wt,z t,µ,)dTSt + Fzt+1(wt+1,z t+1,µ,)dzt+1 =0 (20)
where Fzt, Fzt+1 and FTSt are marginal eects of the educational achievement production function
with respect to household inputs in the current and next period, related to initial levels of cognitive
achievement in the next period. The conditioning (wt,z t,µ,) explicitly recognizes that these
marginals will be a function of current levels of inputs as well as child and school non-time varying
characteristics. To achieve this, assets are reduced in period t +2by:








w h i c hd e ﬁ n e st h eu s e rc o s ti nt h ee x p r e s s i o ng i v e nb y5 .
Maximum Likelihood Derivation of the latent variable  Following Birnbaum (1967), we
follow a parametric approach and use the 3 parameter logistic to map the latent variable TS it to
the probability of a correct answer in question j, Pj(TSit) so that
Pj(TSit)=cj +( 1 cj)
1
1+e x p {aj(TS it  bj)}
(22)
Following IRT terminology, the parameter bj measures the di!culty of the item (a location para-
meter), aj measures the discrimination of the item and cj measures the guessing probability. We






Pj(TSit,a j,b j,c j)xij{1  Pj(TSit,a j,b j,c j)}13xij (23)
where xij is the response by individual i to question j. Maximization of the likelihood function then
gives us the required normal equations. We use a Marginal Maximum Likelihood estimation (Bock
and Lieberman 1971) in combination with an Expected-Maximization (EM) algorithm (Bock and
Aitkin 1980). Under this scheme, a density function is assumed for the latent variable, f(TSit).
This is then “integrated-out” to arrive at consistent estimates of the item parameters (aj,b j,c j).Wkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 36
As the last step the item parameters are then used to calculate TSit. Finally, Fisher’s information











The standard error or our estimate g TSit is now simply 1 sS
j Ij(TSit) and by the property of ML
estimators g TS it  N(TSit, 1 sS
j Ij(TSit)). Note that once the structural parameters {aj,b j, and cj}
are determined for the test in 2001, since the same test was administered again in 2002, we again
identify the change in the distribution of TSit without assuming a density function for 2002.Wkhq Cdq Sfkrro Iqsxwv Ipsuryh Thvw-Sfruhv? 37
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Log GNP per capita (US $ 1997)
NER 1996 Boys Quadratic Fit
ZAM _00 refers to 2000 data for Zambia
Comparision Among African Countries
Net Enrollment Rates
Source: UNESCO (2002). This graph shows the relationship between net enrollment rates and log GNP per capita in 
selected African countries, with a fitted quadratic. Zambia lies above the fitted line, suggesting that the enrollment in 
Zambia is greater than what would be predicted through per capita income alone. 





































































































































































































Source: Based on Filmerand Pritchett (1999)
Note: These graphs show educational attainment plots of the percentage of children enrolled against age. For all regions 
and income categories, we find that strong evidence of delayed enrollment with enrollment increasing with age until 
age 12 and then tapering off or declining. The graphs also show how educational outcomes have worsened between 
1992 and 1996, with a decline in enrollment at every age group and for all socioeconomic levels. WHENCAN SCHOOL INPUTS IMPROVE TEST-SCORES? 42
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Share: Household Expenditure Share: Teachers Salary












Low Funding Schools High Funding Schools
Share: Household Expenditure Share: Teachers Salary




Source: ESD Sample (2002). The pi-chart shows how educational inputs are funded in schools that received high/low 
anticipated funds. The shares are computed as the average of shares across schools. 
1.  Teachers Salary is computed as salary divided by the number of students in the teachers class. This is 
computed for a sample of teachers who were interviewed if they were either currently teaching Grade VI or 
Grade V students, or had taught Grade V students in the previous year. The particular sample was chosen to 
ensure that teacher characteristics could be matched to students who were tested in both years. Salaries will 
therefore be biased if there is selection of teachers into different grade levels. 
2.  Household expenditure is based on a one-year recall question of household educational expenditure for every 
child on various items including textbooks, school supplies, and uniforms. 
3.  Discretionary funds are unanticipated by households. WHENCAN SCHOOL INPUTS IMPROVE TEST-SCORES? 43
Figure 4: Test Characteristics English and Math 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Examination Council of Zambia data. These two graphs show the standard 
error of the estimation for the latent ability (knowledge) variable. The line in the middle plots ability against itself, 
while the lines on the outsides plot the 95% confidence intervals where the standard errors are calculated from Fisher’s 
information for maximum likelihood estimates. Thus for instance, in both the Mathematics and the English 
examination, the exam was “too hard” so that the confidence band at lower ability levels is larger than that at higher 
ability levels. Further, the Mathematics exam is more “noisy” than the English exam with larger confidence bands, 
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Test Standard Error: math
Ability (ml estimate)
 95% CI 5% CI
 Ability (ml estimate)
-1.9284 2.6125
-5.53114
3.21027WHENCAN SCHOOL INPUTS IMPROVE TEST-SCORES? 44






















































































































































Kernel Smoothing Source: ESD Study
Funding and Cognitive Achievement
Note: This figure shows the relationship between anticipated/unanticipated funds and gains in cognitive 
achievement. For both graphs, the histogram of funding is plotted on the left axis and the relationship 
between cognitive gains and funding is plotted on the right axis. In the case of unanticipated funds, a large 
number of schools receive 0 funds and conditional on receipt, there is very high variance in the amount 
received. For anticipated funds, the distribution mirrors the distribution of enrollment and is evenly 
distributed on the sample range. The relationship between cognitive gains and unanticipated funding is 
positive and significant for both Mathematics and English and not significantly different from zero for 
anticipated funding. WHENCAN SCHOOL INPUTS IMPROVE TEST-SCORES? 45
 Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics: School Enrollment and Staffing 
Category Variable  Urban  Rural 
`Remote’ Schools 
(HH Sample) 





















































Average value of wealth-index of households 







(0.43)  Pupil 






Percentage of schools who received anticipated 











































Note: ESD Sample. Standard-Deviations in brackets.  
1.  Pass-Rates are for the Grade VII examination administered to all students by the Examination Council of 
Zambia. 
2.  The wealth index is based on a weighted aggregation of household assets similar to a principal components 
analysis, but with weights optimally derived to minimize classification errors. Details are in Das and others 
(2003, Appendix 1). 
3.  For anticipated funding, 2.25% of schools received more than the allotted amount, to a maximum of $800.  
Unconditional logs for cash-grants are calculated by generating lnX=ln(X+b) if X=0, where b is determined optimally. WHENCAN SCHOOL INPUTS IMPROVE TEST-SCORES? 46














Total Enrollment in School  862  981  NO
Distance to District Office (% 
within 5 KM) 
48.1% 60.4%  NO
School 
characteristics 
Distance to Provincial Office (% 
within 5 KM) 
20.7% 18.6%  NO













Source: ESD Sample. Standard-deviations in brackets. This table checks to see whether schools that 
received discretionary funds were “different” along observable dimensions from those that did not. We find 
no difference in either school characteristics or test-scores in 2001 between schools that received such 
funds versus those that did not. The wealth index is based on a weighted aggregation of household assets 
similar to a principal components analysis, but with weights optimally derived to minimize classification 
errors. Details are in Das and others (2003, Appendix 1). Test scores are the maximum likelihood estimates 
of the latent variable as described in Appendix 1.WHENCAN SCHOOL INPUTS IMPROVE TEST-SCORES? 47






schools  Significant? 
Matching 
Success 
% School going Children 
attending surveyed 
school 





19,576 10,794  YES 
Average Anticipated 
Grant 





Total Enrollment in 
School 
572.15 232.77 YES 
Schools Asset Index  -.75  -.93  YES 
Households Asset index  0.018  -0.054  NO 
% Children with mothers 
in household 
72.5 79.8  YES 
% With fathers in 
household 
65.0 72.5  YES 
% whose mothers can 
read




% whose fathers can read  72.5  79.8  NO 
% who say Head-
Teacher is good 
0.79 0.84  NO 
% who say that Teacher 
visited household 
52.9 74.2  YES  Observable 
components of 
schools 
%For whom school is 
within 30 minutes 
50.6 70.7  YES 
Village 
Enrollment 
% Enrollment in Village  .78  .80  NO 
Note:  
1.  Two private schools are excluded from the sample. 
2.  All tests of percentages are probability tests, all tests of continuous variables are t-tests. 
3.  Significant differences are at the 1% confidence level. 
4.  Schools Asset index is the average value of the asset index for children in the school matched to the 
household. 
This table compares observable characteristics of households and schools for schools that received low and high 
anticipated funds, respectively. We find that for a number of characterisitics, there is no diffference between the two 
categories. For variables where differences are significant (% with fathers in households or distance to school) the 
relationship with enrollment is the opposite of what one might expect, suggesting that there is no systematic correlation 
between enrollment at the school level, which determines anticipated funding, and household characteristics.WHENCAN SCHOOL INPUTS IMPROVE TEST-SCORES? 48
 Table 3: Relationship between Household and School Funding 









































































































































Observations 1410  1410  1410  1410  1410  1410 
Note: The regressions in this table show the effect of anticipated and unanticipated funding on children’s 
educational expenditures (the dependant variable in all regressions). Estimates marked ** are significant at 
1%, * denotes significance at 5% and standard errors are presented in [brackets]. Anticipated funding is 
either funding that had been received by the school at the time of the survey or funding that had not yet 
arrived. Estimates from the former are presented in columns (1) and (2) and the latter in columns (3) and 
(4). Columns (5) and (6) present the test of weak exogeneity (Blundell and Smith (1986)) where the 
residual from the first stage regression determining log anticipated funds is included as an additional 
regressor. All regressions control for the mean wealth of students in the school, province dummies and a 
rural dummy. The censoring is at 0 for the Tobit and the random effects Tobit specifications account for the 
clustering of errors at the level of the village. Marginal effects (conditional on being uncensored) and the 
probability of censoring are presented in Table 4. Further (a) for all regressions, K100 is added to zero 
values of discretionary funding to allow logs. The minimum funding is K900 conditional on receipt; (b) 
two private schools are excluded from the analysis; (c) K50 is added to enrolled children with zero 
educational expenditures who form 4.96% of the sample; (d) the wealth index is based on optimal 
maximum likelihood weights (see Das and others (2003) for details). Results are robust to alternative 
indices (for instance an unweighted raw sum). WHENCAN SCHOOL INPUTS IMPROVE TEST-SCORES? 49
Table 4: Marginal Effects and Probability of Censoring 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Base Regression: Tobit 
Specification 
Base Regression: Tobit 
with Random Effects 
Hypothesis 2: Tobit 
Specification 

































































Note: This table shows the marginal effects at mean values of the regressors based on the coefficients from Table 3. 
In all cases, the significance of estimated coefficients is robust to clustering at the village level. The estimated 
elasticity increases substantially when we use anticipated instead of received funding, confirming that households 
make their educational expenditure decisions before such funding is actually received. WHENCAN SCHOOL INPUTS IMPROVE TEST-SCORES? 50
Table 5: Funding and Test Scores 








































































































Observations  177  177 176  176 176  176 176  176 
R-squared  0.05  0.02 0.15  0.04 0.13  0.03 0.17  0.03 
Note: This table shows OLS estimates for the relationship between unanticipated/anticipated funding and gains in 
cognitive achievement for English and Mathematics. For all regressions standard errors are in [brackets], * denotes 
significance at 5% and ** at 10% levels of significance. Columns (1) and (2) report coefficients without any further 
controls, Columns (3) and (4) include whether the school is rural, whether the head-teacher changed in the previous 
year, whether the PTA changed in the previous year, differences in PTA fees between 2002 and 2001 and a dummy for 
private schools. Columns (5) and (6) report results from using a dummy for whether the school received unanticipated 
funds or not with the same set of controls. Columns (7) and (8) present estimation results when we use the legislated 
anticipated funds rather than the anticipated funds received at the time of the survey. For the sample, 3 schools with 
unlikely changes (>2 or <-2 standard deviations) are dropped from sample and the optimal b=3.73 is added on to 
unanticipated funds to compute the log. All regressions are clustered at the district level. The results from the Wald 
test for equality of marginal impacts for anticipated and unanticipated funds at different points of the sample range are 
presented in the text. The results show that we can reject the null hypothesis for English at the 5% level for the sample 
mean, median, 25
th and 75
th percentile. We cannot reject the null at these values of the sample for Mathematics. WHENCAN SCHOOL INPUTS IMPROVE TEST-SCORES? 51
Table 6: Predicting Discretionary Funds (First Stage) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Amount of unanticipated 
funds received conditional 
on receipt 
Amount of unanticipated 
funds (squared) received 
conditional on receipt 
Probability of receiving 
unanticipated funds 
(Marginal Coefficients) 
Grade VII Male Pass Rate 







Grade VII Female Pass 





















Log of district receipts 








Log of province receipts 


























Observations 38  38 164 
R-squared  0.50  0.52  LR (chi2) = 28.87 
Note: This regression shows the first stage of the IV strategy using a hurdle model. For all regressions 
standard errors are in [brackets], * denotes significance at 5% and ** at 10% levels of significance. 
Columns (1) and (2) show the estimation results conditional on receipts for unanticipated funding and 
unanticipated funding squared, while Column (3) estimates the probability of receiving such funding. The 
log of district receipts from external sources was computed through a questionnaire administered to district 
authorities and that for provincial receipts through surveys administered at the province level. The two 
dummies for politically active districts is based on interviews and newspaper articles in the run-up to the 
election. The predicted value for the second stage is calculated as E(y)=E(y|receipt) x Prob(receipt).WHENCAN SCHOOL INPUTS IMPROVE TEST-SCORES? 52
Table 7: Learning and Funding (IV Results) 


































































Observations 164  164 164  164  164  164 
R-squared 0.16  0.03  0.18  0.04  0.15  0.05 
Note: This table shows second stage IV estimates for the relationship between unanticipated/anticipated 
funding and gains in cognitive achievement for English and Mathematics. For all estimates, standard errors 
are reported in [brackets], * denotes significance at 5% and ** at 10% levels of significance. Columns (1) 
and (2) report coefficients include controls for whether the school is rural, whether the head-teacher 
changed in the previous year, whether the PTA changed in the previous year, differences in PTA fees 
between 2002 and 2001 and a dummy for private schools. Columns (3) and (4) report results using 
legislated anticipated funds rather than the anticipated funds received at the time of the survey. Columns (5) 
and (6) report results for comparison with OLS results from the same sample. For the sample, 3 schools 
with unlikely changes (>2 or <-2 standard deviations) are dropped and an additional 13 schools are dropped 
due to lack of data at the district level. All regressions are clustered at the district level. The results from the 
Wald test for equality of marginal impacts for anticipated and unanticipated funds at different points of the 
sample range are presented in the text. The results show that we can reject the null hypothesis for English at 
the 1% level for the sample mean, median, and 25
th percentile and at the 5% level for the 75
th and 90
th
percentile. For Mathematics we can reject the null at the 5% level for the 25
th percentile and the 10% level 
for the sample mean and median. We cannot reject the null for the 75
th and 90
th percentiles.